

REMARKS:

Claims 1-35 remain in the application for consideration of the Examiner.

Claims 1-3, 5-7, 10-20, 23-27, 30-32, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) over Wookey (U.S. Patent No. 6,023,507). Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wookey in view of Steen (U.S. Patent No. 6,510,350). Claims 8, 9, 21, 22, 28, 29, and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wookey in view of Du (U.S. Patent No. 5,826,239). Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wookey in view of Steen and further in view of Du.

Reconsideration and withdrawal of the outstanding rejections is respectfully requested in light of the following remarks.

REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102:

Claims 1-3, 5-7, 10-20, 23-27, 30-32, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) over Wookey (U.S. Patent No. 6,023,507).

However, Wookey fails to disclose all of the limitations of claims 1-3, 5-7, 10-20, 23-27, 30-32, and 34, as discussed below. Therefore, Wookey cannot anticipate claims 1-3, 5-7, 10-20, 23-27, 30-32, and 34.

A claim is anticipated by a prior art reference only if the reference discloses or inherently describes every detail of the claim. According to the MPEP, “[a] claim is anticipated only if *each and every element* as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”¹ Also according to the MPEP, “[T]he identical invention must be shown in as *complete detail* as is contained in the ... claim.”²

¹ MPEP 2131, citing *Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987), emphasis added.

² MPEP 2131, citing *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989), emphasis added.

Claims 1-3, 5-7, 10, and 11

Claims 2, 3, 5-7, 10, and 11 depend from independent claim 1. Claim 1 recites *inter alia*:

one or more agents each operable to monitor one or more corresponding applications in response to a command received from a monitoring and management portal coupled to the network outside the domain, and generate notifications in response to the occurrence of events associated with the corresponding applications;

(Emphasis added.) Thus, claim 1 specifically recites (1) that a command is received from outside the domain, and (2) agent(s) monitor applications in response to the command received from outside the domain. Claims 2, 3, 5-7, 10, and 11 depend from claim 1 and therefore include the same limitations at least by reference.

Wookey fails to disclose these limitations. Wookey discloses only *local* administrative control *for initiating (scheduling) the monitoring mode*. Referring to Figure 4 and column 8, lines 31-33 and 52-67 of Wookey, the monitored computers 401-409 include *local* monitors 421, which each include an administrator tool. The administrator tool in Wookey allows a user to control and schedule the monitoring.

Answer to “Response to Arguments”

The “Response to Arguments” on page 18 of the present Office Action states:

[Wookey] teaches in response to a scheduler command maintained a service center (monitor and management portal) for transmitting diagnostic result to the service center via the internet (see col. 4 lines 11-16) through a firewall (see FIG. 3 and col. 4 lines 49-52). Firewall is a security gateway to protect undesired access in to a domain (see col. 4 lines 52-53). Therefore, it is clear that the service center must has its own domain that coupled to the network for communication with other domains of the monitoring computers.

Thus, the Office Action seems allege that the service center 101 shown in Figures 1 and 3 of Wookey anticipates the limitation of “agents each operable to monitor...applications in response to a command received from a...portal coupled to the network outside the domain” recited in claim 1. This allegation is respectfully traversed as follows.

In short, the service center 101 disclosed in Wookey does not issue commands for causing agents to monitor applications. Instead, Wookey discloses *local control/scheduling* using monitors 421 that are *local* to monitored computers. The service center 101 merely collects information generated during the local monitoring; Wookey is **silent** with respect to the **local monitors performing the monitoring in response to a command** from the service center 101. This distinction is explained in greater detail below.

The service center 101 and monitored system 102 are shown in Figure 1 of Wookey. The service center 101 is shown in greater detail in Figure 3, and the monitored system is shown in greater detail in Figure 4.

Figure 2 shows a high-level flow diagram of how the overall system shown in Figure 1 works. Thus, it is helpful to refer to Figure 2 in explaining the difference between Wookey and the present invention.

Attention is drawn to step 201 in Figure 2 of Wookey, which states "each computer runs diagnostics at scheduled intervals." Thus, a pertinent question relates to how the diagnostics are scheduled. Wookey answers this question by stating that "*[t]he monitor [421] schedules, executes, and stores the results of diagnostic tests, and is maintained by a simple administrator interface.*" Wookey, col. 6, ll. 9-12. Wookey is clear that the "monitor" is *local* to each monitored machine (and "remote" relative to the service center 101):

Referring to FIG. 4, additional details of a monitored system according to the present invention are shown. The monitored system includes remote monitoring software. In one embodiment, the remote monitoring software includes the **monitor program 421 running on each of the slaves 401-407 and on the master 409**. The diagnostic tests 423 also run on each of the computers 401-409. In addition, the remote monitoring software on the monitored system includes an administrator tool, and communications software. Disks 427 are illustrative of the fact that master 409 may be a server machine requiring extra disk storage capability.

The remote monitoring software monitor 421 is the controlling software that runs on each machine to be monitored. It may run all the time in daemon mode, running diagnostics on the machine and filing away the results to be transmitted back to the service center. The monitor provides

an interface into the communication software 425 which provides the master with the necessary software for communicating to the remote service center. In one embodiment, when modems are utilized, the communications software will support modem communication to the service center. In other embodiments, the communication software provides, e.g., internet capability.

Wookey, col. 5, ll. 51-55 (emphasis added). Thus, monitors 421 that are *local* to the computers being monitored are responsible for scheduling and executing the monitoring tasks; the monitors are therefore monitoring in response to their own local control rather than from a command received from a remote location such as the service center 101.

Turning back to Figure 2, the next step is step 203 where “each computer saves results in files.” As Wookey restates, “[e]ach computer stores the results of those diagnostics at step 203 in log files....” Wookey, col. 3, ll. 52-53. Then, step 205 in Figure 2 is “collect diagnostic results at master” and step 207 is “download to service center [101] at scheduled intervals.” As Wookey restates with respect to step 207, “[f]inally, at 207, the diagnostic information from all of the computers is communicated to the service center [101] at scheduled intervals.” Wookey, col. 3, ll. 59-61. This supports the fact stated above that the service center 101 merely collects information; the service center 101 does not issue any commands for controlling the monitoring.

Thus, Wookey fails to disclose “one or more **agents** each operable to monitor one or more corresponding applications **in response to a command received from** a monitoring and management portal coupled to the network **outside the domain**” as recited in claim 1. The service center disclosed in Wookey does not issue commands for causing agents or monitors to monitor applications. Also, the mere fact that Wookey discloses a service center that collects diagnostic information from remote computers is insufficient to anticipate claim 1. The limitations of claim 1 are too specific to be anticipated by merely collecting information. Claim 1 requires that agents be “operable to monitor...applications **in response to a command received from...outside the domain**.” The local monitors (421) in Wookey do not monitor “in response to a command” from the service center 101. Instead, the local monitors perform the monitoring based on their own local control/scheduling. The collection of information by the service center does not

involve any commands for initiating or causing the local monitors to perform their monitoring. In other words, there is no "command" as recited in claim 1.

As noted above, the standard for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is a high standard: a claim is anticipated by a prior art reference only if the reference discloses or inherently describes every detail of the claim. Here, Wookey clearly fails to disclose every detail of claim 1.

Therefore, based on the standards set forth in the MPEP and cited above, the disclosure of Wookey is *not* sufficient for establishing that Wookey anticipates claim 1 because Wookey clearly fails to disclose all of the limitations of claim 1 in as *complete detail* as is contained in claim 1. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Wookey cannot anticipate claim 1, or claims 2-11, which depend from claim 1.

Claims 12-20, 23-27, 30-32, and 34

With respect to claims 12, 24, 31, 32, and 34, each of these claims includes limitations similar to the limitations of claim 1 discussed above. Thus, claims 12, 24, 31, 32, and 34, as well as their respective dependent claims, are considered patentably distinguishable over Wookey for at least the reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1.

In light of the above, it is respectfully submitted that claims 1-3, 5-7, 10-20, 23-27, 30-32, and 34 are in condition for allowance, and notice to that effect is respectfully requested.

THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR ANTICIPATION REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102:

The following sets forth the legal standards for "anticipation."

The events that can lead to anticipation can be divided into the following seven categories, all defined by statute:

1. Prior Knowledge: The invention was publicly known in the United States before the patentee invented it.

2. Prior Use: The invention was publicly used in the United States either (i) before the patentee invented it; or (ii) more than one year before he filed his patent application.

3. Prior Publication: The invention was described in a printed publication anywhere in the world either (i) before the patentee invented it; or (ii) more than one year before he filed his patent application.

4. Prior Patent: The invention was patented in another patent anywhere in the world either (i) before the patentee invented it; or (ii) more than one year before he filed his application.

5. On Sale: The invention was on sale in the United States more than one year before the patentee filed his application.

6. Prior Invention: The invention was invented by another person in the United States before the patentee invented it, and that other person did not abandon, suppress or conceal the invention.

7. Prior U.S. Patent: The invention was described in a patent granted on a patent application filed in the United States before the patentee made the invention.

Each of those seven events has its own particular requirements, but they all have the following requirements in common:

1. Anticipation must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.

2. If one prior art reference completely embodies the same process or product as any claim, the product or process of that claim is anticipated by the prior art, and that claim is invalid. To decide whether anticipation exists, one must consider each of the elements recited in the claim and determine whether all of them are found in the particular item alleged to be anticipating prior art.

3. There is no anticipation unless every one of those elements is found in a *single* prior publication, prior public use, prior invention, prior patent, prior knowledge or

prior sale. One may not combine two or more items of prior art to make out an anticipation. One should, however, take into consideration, not only what is expressly disclosed or embodied in the particular item of prior art, but also what inherently occurred in its practice.

4. There cannot be an accidental or unrecognized anticipation. A prior duplication of the claimed invention that was accidental, or unrecognized, unappreciated, and incidental to some other purpose is not an invalidating anticipation.

Those four requirements must be kept in mind and applied to each kind of anticipation in issue. The following additional requirements apply to some categories of anticipation.

1. Prior Knowledge: An invention is anticipated if it was known by others in the United States before it was invented by the patentee. "Known," in this context, means known to the public. Private knowledge, secret knowledge or knowledge confined to a small, limited group is not necessarily an invalidating anticipation. Things that were known to the public only outside the United States are not invalidating anticipation.

2. Prior Use: An invention is anticipated if it was used by others before it was invented by the patentee, or more than one year before the patentee filed his patent application. "Use," in this context, means a public use.

3. Prior Publication: A patent is invalid if the invention defined by the claims was described in a printed publication before it was invented by the patentee or more than one year prior to the filing date of his application. For a publication to constitute an anticipation of an invention, it must be capable, when taken in conjunction with the knowledge of people of ordinary skill in the art, of placing the invention in the possession of the reader. The disclosure must be enabling and meaningful. In determining whether the disclosure is complete, enabling, and meaningful, one should take into account what would have been within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time, and one may consider other publications that shed light on the knowledge such a person would have had.

4. Prior Patent: If the invention defined by the claims was patented in the United States or a foreign country, either before it was invented by the inventor or more than one year before the inventor filed his patent application, then the invention was anticipated. The effective date for this type of anticipation is the date on which two things co-existed: (i) the owner of the referenced patent had the right to enforce that patent; and (ii) the reference patent was available to the public. What was "patented" in the reference patent is determined by what is defined by its claims, interpreted in the light of the general description.

5. On Sale: A patent is invalid if the invention claimed in it was on sale in the United States more than one year prior to the application filing date.

6. Prior Invention: If the invention defined by the claims was invented by another person, in the United States, before it was invented by the inventor, and that other person did not abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention, the invention lacks novelty. A prior invention, even if put in physical form and shown to produce the desired result, is not an invalidating anticipation unless some steps were taken to make it public. However, it is not necessary that the inventor had knowledge of that prior invention.

7. Prior U.S. Application: A patent is invalid for lack of novelty if the invention defined by the claims was described in a United States patent issued on a patent application filed by another person before the invention was made by the inventor. The effective date of a prior application for purposes of this issue is the date on which it was filed in the United States. Foreign-filed patent applications do not apply. If the issued United States patent claims the benefit of more than one United States application, its effective date as an anticipation is the filing date of the first United States application that discloses the invention claimed in that referenced patent.

Experimental Use Exception: The law recognizes that it is beneficial to permit the inventor the time and opportunity to develop his invention. As such there is an "experimental use" exception to the "public use" and "on sale" rules. Even though the invention was publicly used or on sale, more than one year prior to the application filing date, that does not invalidate the patent, provided the principal purpose was experimenta-

tion rather than commercial benefit. If the primary purpose was experimental, it does not matter that the public used the invention or that the inventor incidentally derived profit from it.

When a public use or sale is shown, the burden is on the inventor to come forward with evidence to support the experimental use exception. Only experimentation by or under the control of the inventor qualifies for this exception. Experimentation by a third party, for its own purposes, does not qualify for this exception. Once the invention leaves the inventor's control, its use is a public one, even if further experimentation takes place.

The experimentation must relate to the claimed features of the invention. And it must be for the purpose of technological improvement, not commercial exploitation. If any commercial exploitation does occur, it must be merely incidental to the primary purpose of experimentation. A test done primarily for marketing, and only incidentally for technological improvement, is a public use.

REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103:

Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wookey in view of Steen (U.S. Patent No. 6,510,350). Claims 8, 9, 21, 22, 28, 29, and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wookey in view of Du (U.S. Patent No. 5,826,239). Claim 33 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Wookey in view of Steen and further in view of Du.

Claims 4, 8, and 9 depend from claim 1, claims 21 and 22 depend from claim 12, and claims 28 and 29 depend from claim 24. As discussed above, claim 1 recites "an application management layer within the domain comprising...agents each operable to monitor...applications in response to a command received from a monitoring and management portal coupled to the network outside the domain," and claims 12, 24, 33, and 35 include similar limitations.

As also discussed above, Wookey fails to disclose or suggest these limitations of claims 1, 12, 24, and 31-35. It is respectfully submitted that Steen and Du fail to cure this deficiency of Wookey. Thus, the proposed combinations of Wookey, Steen, and Du cannot render obvious claims 1, 12, 24, and 31-35.

In light of the above, it is respectfully submitted that claims 4, 8, 9, 21, 22, 28, 29, 33, and 35 are in condition for allowance, and notice to that effect is respectfully requested.

The Legal Standard for Obviousness Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 103:

To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, and not based on applicant's disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991); M.P.E.P. § 2142. Moreover, all the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art. *In re Royka*, 490 F.2d 981, 180 U.S.P.Q. 580 (CCPA 1974). If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, then any claim depending therefrom is nonobvious. *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988); M.P.E.P. § 2143.03.

With respect to alleged obviousness, there must be something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination. *Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.*, 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In fact, the absence of a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination. *Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.*, 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The mere fact that the prior art can be combined or modified does not make the resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests the desirability of the combination. *In re Mills*, 916 F.2d 680, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990); M.P.E.P. § 2143.01. The consistent criterion for determining obviousness is whether the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that the process should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in the light of the prior art. Both the suggestion and the expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, not in the Applicant's

disclosure. *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991); *In re O'Farrell*, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988); M.P.E.P. § 2142.

A recent Federal Circuit case makes it clear that, in an obviousness situation, the prior art must disclose each and every element of the claimed invention, and that any motivation to combine or modify the prior art must be based upon a suggestion in the prior art. *In re Lee*, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Conclusory statements regarding common knowledge and common sense are insufficient to support a finding of obviousness. *Id.* at 1434-35.

CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing remarks, this application is considered to be in condition for allowance, and early reconsideration and a Notice of Allowance are earnestly solicited.

The undersigned hereby authorizes the Director to charge any fees that may be required, or credit any overpayments, to **Deposit Account No. 500777**. If an extension of time is necessary for allowing this Response to be timely filed, this document is to be construed as also constituting a Petition for Extension of Time Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) to the extent necessary. Any fee required for such Petition for Extension of Time should be charged to **Deposit Account No. 500777**.

Please link this application to Customer No. 53184 so that its status may be checked via the PAIR System.

Respectfully submitted,

26 DEC 2005
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